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A West Virginia statute requires students in public schools regularly to
salute the flag of the United States. Marie and Gathie Barnette, faithful
Jehovah’s Witnesses, refuse to comply. They are expelled from school. The
children challenge the sanction, ultimately prevailing in the Supreme Court.
The Court concludes its opinion with a rousing peroration: “[N]o official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, religion,
nationalism, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein.”1 This statement is now famous. But it has a curious
feature: It sheds nearly no light on how to resolve claims like the Barnettes’.
This is because public schools are places where government
“officials”—chiefly public schoolteachers—articulate orthodoxies every
day. This is true even in schools that purport to emphasize intellectual skills
over content. Two plus two is four, not five.2 The earth rotates about the sun.3

*Professor

of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to all of the participants in the
Barnette at 75 Symposium and to Howard Wasserman for including me among their number. I am
indebted to Daniel Braunfeld, Abner Greene, Hillel Levin, and David Morris for their engagement with
this project. I also owe thanks to the Fordham Law School for its financial support and to the indefatigable
Juan Fernandez of the Fordham Law Library.
1

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

See Thomas A. Romberg, Problematic Features of the School Mathematics Curriculum, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CURRICULUM 749, 764 (Philip W. Jackson ed., 1992).
2

3 See Stacy Palen & AmyJo Proctor, Astronomy in the K–8 Core Curriculum: A Survey of State
Requirements Nationwide, 5 ASTRONOMY EDUC. REV. 23, 25 (2006).
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Human beings, who evolved from apes,4 today act to warm the Earth.5
Democracy is preferable to dictatorship.6 Martin Luther King, Jr., is a heroic
figure.7 Teachers not only systematically articulate such claims, moreover,
but routinely demand their pupils’ assent. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how
teaching and learning could proceed without teachers making truth claims
that they expect children both to absorb and to acknowledge.
One therefore cannot demur to the constitutionality of governmentally
established public schools and still claim that government may neither define
nor compel assent to any orthodoxy. As Nikolas Bowie argues, First
Amendment absolutes,8 like the famous no-compulsion rule of Barnette,9
necessarily give way when their application would undermine “society’s
ability to self-govern.”10 Public schools are the wellspring of the social
capacity for self-government.11 Their quotidian, ubiquitous, and unavoidable
compulsions therefore offer an excellent example of what Bowie calls the
“government-could-not-work doctrine,” which, he argues, is and must be
“the baseline for interpreting the First Amendment’s terms.”12
Therefore, parties like the Barnettes must argue that the forced Pledge
constitutes a particular kind of orthodoxy, or a particular form of assent, that
may not be enforced.13 Such an argument demands a theory of compelled
speech in school, one that indicates under which circumstances teachers may

4 See Bertha Vazquez, A State-By-State Comparison of Middle School Science Standards on
Evolution in the United States, 10 EVOLUTION: EDUC. & OUTREACH 1, 4 (2017).
5 See M.V. Rajeev Gowda, Jeffrey C. Fox & Robin D. Magelky, Students’ Understanding of
Climate Change: Insights for Scientists and Educators, 78 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 2232,
2239 (1997) (discussing the development of “educational modules that correct students’ misconceptions
about climate-related concepts”); Julie Andrzejewski, The Social Justice, Peace, and Environmental
Education Standards Project, 7 MULTICULTURAL PERSP. 8, 9–10 (2005) (reporting that “educational
standards” with respect to teaching climate change “are strenuously contested in the struggle to control
the perception of reality by children and youth”).
6 See Gerald Marker & Howard Mehlinger, Social Studies, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
CURRICULUM, supra note 2, at 830, 832; Warren A. Nord, Moral Disagreement, Moral Education,
Common Ground, in MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY 142, 142 (Diane Ravitch
& Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001).
7 See John S. Wills, ‘Some People Even Died’: Martin Luther King, Jr, the Civil Rights Movement
and the Politics of Remembrance in Elementary Classrooms, 18 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE STUD. IN EDUC.
109, 113–15, 125–26 (2005).
8 Barnette describes its rule as a “fixed star in our constitutional constellation.” W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
9 See Nikolas Bowie, The Government-Could-Not-Work Doctrine, 105 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2019)
(Barnette’s “peroration was never literally true”).
10

Id. at 39.

11

See infra notes 74–75, 95 and accompanying text.

12

Bowie, supra note 9, at 40.

See Brief for Appellee at 46–48, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(No. 591), 1943 WL 71856, at *46–48.
13
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tell students what to say, and under which they must not. Barnette does in
fact articulate such a theory. It appears in the context of Justice Jackson’s
explanation of why it is proper for the Court to interfere in the practices of
local schools. “That they,” i.e., schools, “are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.”14 This, I argue, reflects a Progressive theory of civics education:
In order to teach students about their rights, one must allow them to practice
those rights, in the context of a school community. This theory tracks the
experiential pedagogy advocated by educational thinkers and advocates
contemporary to Barnette, of whom John Dewey is the most prominent
exemplar.
This Essay develops these two descriptive claims and then makes a
normative argument. Part I elaborates the first claim, that public schools are,
and must be, routine sites of compelled speech. Part II argues that Barnette
understands what kinds of in-school speech may be compelled and what
kinds may not in ways congruent with the roughly contemporaneous thinking
of Progressive educators, Dewey in particular.
Part III then considers the implications of these observations for how we
understand the constitutional law governing student expression today.
Barnette constitutionalized an educational Deweyian Progressivism at a time
when the American public school system was hegemonically Progressive in
its deep structure. Today, however, American education is fairly far along in
abandoning its Progressive roots. In a post-Progressive era, it is appropriate
to reject the elevation of Progressive educational theory to the level of
constitutional requirement.
I.

TO BE A SCHOOL IS TO COMPEL SPEECH

Barnette declares that “no official, high or petty,” may compel citizens
to assent to government “orthodox[ies].”15 But public schools, which are
agencies of the state, and public schoolteachers, who are the state’s paid
agents,16 ubiquitously compel students to do just that. Justice Frankfurter was
factually accurate when he wrote in Minersville v. Gobitis—the case that
would be overruled within a few short years by Barnette—that “compulsions

14

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).

15

Id. at 642.

16

See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979).
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. . . necessarily pervade . . . much of the educational process.”17 This was true
in the 1940s, and it is true today.
There are three elements to that compulsion, each basic to American
educational practice. First, public schools confront students with a stateestablished curriculum and state-provided teachers who assert the truth and
rightness of numerous claims. Second, students must, in order to avoid
sometimes serious penalties, explicitly agree with such assertions, or disagree
only in ways that the school permits. And, finally, students are required to
attend school; they cannot escape school’s compulsions without violating the
law.
A.

Schools Establish Orthodoxies

“Orthodoxy”—that thing which Barnette forbids government officials
to “prescribe” and to which it prohibits them from compelling citizens’
assent—means “true belief.”18 But among the chief goals of public schooling
is to inculcate in the young beliefs that are true. Certainly, a school fails in
its task if it produces pupils who believe things that are false.
In this context, moreover, truth bears a fairly capacious meaning. We
care that students be taught to believe not only facts that are objectively true,
such as the truths of arithmetic, or that are empirically true, like the truths of
chemistry. As Malcolm Redish and Kevin Finnerty observe, schools seek
also to instill
certain substantive values deemed by government to be
morally fundamental and certain facts deemed to be
indisputable: That the United States is the greatest nation on
earth, for example; that all humans are created equal; that
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln were true
American heroes; and a variety of other empirical or
normative precepts that have been so ingrained in Americans
that one hardly notices them.19
They do so, moreover, notwithstanding that determining such moral,
ethical, historical, and political truths requires normative judgment, including

17

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940).

18

From the Greek orthos (straight, correct) and doxa (belief).

Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values
Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 64 (2002); see also
Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80 (“[A] State properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation to promote
civic virtues and understanding in their classes . . . .”); Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 367, 374 (2010) (“Prescribing orthodoxy has occurred most notably in public
grade schools.”).
19

2019]

Deconstitutionalizing Dewey

769

many judgments that are not only contestable but that are actively contested
in society:
Agents of the state—whether they be government
bureaucrats, school principals, or the individual teachers—
determine … whether students will be taught that Columbus
was a hero or that he was a genocidal murderer, how
Huckleberry Finn’s moral dilemma about the conflict
between property rights and human dignity should have been
resolved, and whether the United States treated Native
Americans fairly in the course of the nation’s western
expansion. State officials will determine whether the New
Deal will be presented as a legitimate political and economic
advance, whether women have been mistreated throughout
American history, whether the House Un-American
Activities Committee functioned as an effective protector of
American society against the threat of external communism,
and whether students will be required to read the works of
Toni Morrison instead of those of Ernest Hemingway.20
Moreover, “teachers often do not present the informational and
normative content as being merely one of a number of conceivable alternative
views of an issue or question. Rather, the authoritarian figure in the classroom
will usually determine which viewpoint is ‘correct.’”21 Public schools, in
short, undertake a program of indoctrination in state orthodoxy that would, if
applied to adults, be egregiously unconstitutional.22
It is possible to imagine schools that genuinely subscribe to no
orthodoxies. The premier example is the famous (and nonpublic) Summerhill
20 Redish & Finnerty, supra note 19, at 65; see also E. Wayne Ross, Diverting Democracy: The
Curriculum Standards Movement and Social Studies Education, 11 INT’L J. SOC. EDUC. 18, 25–28 (1996)
(alleging and critiquing disproportionate “neo-conservative” and “neo-nativist” influence in the
development of American social studies curricula that seeks to “raise up future generations of citizens
who will guarantee cultural survival rather than to use social science techniques of reflective inquiry to
develop social critiques”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Steven Siegel, Ethnocentric
Public School Curriculum in a Multicultural Nation: Proposed Standards for Judicial Review, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 311, 316–19 (1996) (documenting debates in the education profession and in the public
sphere regarding the inclusion in public school curricula of “material about the roles and contributions of
women and minority racial and ethnic groups to the history of the United States”); Stephen Sawchuk, How
History Class Divides Us, EDUC. WK. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/projects/how-historyclass-divides-us.html (documenting debate on whether the defenders of the Alamo should be described as
“heroic” in the Texas history curriculum, and noting that “[w]hat was truly at stake were the underlying
values proponents felt it signaled: What defines American thought and action? What can students take
pride in?”). On state power to make curricular choices, see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 111
(1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“It would be difficult to make a First Amendment case out of a state law
eliminating the subject of higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology from its curriculum.”).
21

Redish & Finnerty, supra note 19, at 65.

22

See Sarabyn, supra note 19, at 374.
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School founded by A.S. Neill, organized on a principle of absolute student
autonomy.23 At Summerhill, no activity is required and all learning is selfdirected.24 Analogues to Summerhill can be found among contemporary
practitioners of “unschooling” and “deschooling.”25 But these models are
worlds away from any public school today existing. Indeed, a public school
structured like Summerhill would violate numerous provisions of any state
education code, which set out minimal curricular requirements, even if it did
not compel patriotic recitations. And it is impossible to believe that Barnette
contemplated requiring public schools entirely to remake themselves as
kingdoms of fully autonomous students, free always to do entirely as they
please.
A substantial literature, more closely tied to public schools as they are,
seeks to limit the class of what constitutes “orthodoxies,” hoping by so doing
to establish workable distinctions between varieties of “truth” public schools
may seek to inculcate and those they may not. The two proposals most
grounded in Barnette itself would distinguish between matters of fact and
matters of opinion—Barnette’s famous prohibition on the promulgation of
orthodoxy limits itself to “politics, religion, nationalism, or other matters of
opinion”26—and between matters of legitimate truth-seeking judgment and
matters of partisanship or ideology—because Barnette declares that “[f]ree
public education, if faithful to the idea of secular instruction and political
neutrality, will not be partisan or the enemy of any class, creed, party, or
faction,” and so will not “impose any ideological discipline.”27 Whatever
work these distinctions might do, however, they fail to distinguish
“orthodoxies” from some other genus of claim.
Fact and opinion cannot be clearly and uncontroversially distinguished
in classrooms—at least once one gets past the teaching of mathematics and
logic.28 A preeminent example is the way that the teaching of several
scientific topics — evolution and anthropogenic climate change being the
preeminent examples — deeply divides the polity, one group perceiving

23

A.S. NEILL, SUMMERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO CHILDREARING 13, 25 (1960).

See Judith G. McMullen, Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate Homeschooling?, 54
S.C. L. REV. 75, 80–81 (2002).
24

25 See IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY 11 (1970) (proposing the principle that “[t]he State
shall make no law with respect to the establishment of education”); John E. Petrovic & Kellie Rolstad,
Educating for Autonomy: Reading Rousseau and Freire Toward a Philosophy of Unschooling, 15
FUTURES IN EDUC. 817, 820–22 (2017).
26

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis added).

27

Id. at 637.

Cases that arise in contexts other than school sometimes do distinguish between fact and
opinion, permitting “pure compulsions to state facts to the government” when the speech compelled is
untethered from any “ideological point of view.” Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX.
L. REV. 355, 379, 381 (2018). This position has proved difficult to maintain consistently. Id. at 380–82.
28
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matters of indisputable fact and the other seeing eminently contestable
theorizing.29 And once one arrives at the teaching of social science, history,
ethics, or patriotism, the distinction has barely any bite at all.30
Similarly, and for similar reasons, efforts to distinguish between
instruction and indoctrination fail.31 Whether a claim being taught is
“secular” or partisan depends upon where one sits.32 Teaching is never
ideologically neutral.
Nearly every “truth” that a school might seek to teach is an “orthodoxy,”
a belief regarding what is true. And these orthodoxies include not only those
formally communicated in the classroom but “normative claims that schools
inevitably reinforce across all subjects, routines, and curricula.”33 These
“routines” include a school’s “atmosphere and priorities, its traditions, the
management of student discipline, the curriculum and how it is taught, [and]
the way adults relate to one another.”34 As Ashley Rogers Berner argues, all
of these are “potentially instructive about the human person, the good society,
the nature of authority, and the purpose of life itself.”35 A fortiori, “truths”
that are central to specifically American citizenship—the equality of the
races, the superiority of democracy, the importance of the franchise, the
centrality of the Bill of Rights—are orthodoxies. But teaching children that
these are true beliefs has been a central goal of public schools since their
beginnings in the common school movement, as Part II describes.
B.

Schools Compel Assent to Their Orthodoxies

Since Barnette was decided, the Court has promulgated a doctrine of
government speech, which permits governments in many cases to speak on

29 See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 612–15 (1993). For
evolution specifically, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592–93 (1987); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Par.
Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999); BRIAN J. ALTERS & SANDRA ALTERS, DEFENDING
EVOLUTION IN THE CLASSROOM: A GUIDE TO THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY 13–16 (2001);
Randy Moore, Creationism in the United States: Banning Evolution from the Classroom, 60 AM. BIOLOGY
TCHR. 486, 486–87 (1998). For climate change, see Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, The
Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in the American Public’s Views of Global Warming,
2001–2010, 52 SOC. Q. 155, 175–78 (2011); Sara Reardon, Climate Change Sparks Battles in Classroom,
333 SCI. 688, 688–89 (2011).
30

Marker & Mehlinger, supra note 6, at 836; Ross, supra note 20, at 25–26.

31

This approach is advocated by Redish & Finnerty, supra note 19, at 102–04.

32

See Stolzenberg, supra note 29, at 612–13.

ASHLEY ROGERS BERNER, PLURALISM AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION: NO ONE WAY TO
SCHOOL 13 (2017).
33
34

Id. at 7.

35

Id. at 7–8.
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their own behalf.36 This development encourages one to read Barnette not to
prohibit state establishment of orthodoxies per se, but to prohibit the state
from “forc[ing] citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”37 This
is a fine reading of Barnette,38 but it does not help with the schools problem.
When schools articulate their ubiquitous orthodoxies, they nearly always do
so in preparation for, or at least in the expectation of, efforts to compel
students to agree.39
The modalities of such compulsion are well known. There is the
examination, whether written or oral.40 There is the forced recital, which was
at issue in Barnette, and which occurs in a somewhat different form every
time a teacher calls upon a student who has not volunteered to speak in
class.41 There is a wide range of required classroom activities, exhibitions,
and presentations. In each case, students are expected to assent to at least
some of the claims that the schools have chosen to present to them as true.
Failure to do so will not usually result in expulsion, as it did for the Barnette
children, or in other school discipline. But it will often result in punishment,
most obviously low marks.42 A pattern of poor or mediocre grades brings
substantial and enduring consequences for children, especially with respect
to future educational opportunity. Enough failing grades result in the
withholding of the diploma, depriving students of a property right.43
Behavioral expectations, which also reflect the value judgments of a school’s
orthodoxies, can bring sanctions up to and including expulsion.44
An important strain in contemporary pedagogy would claim that
enlightened teachers do not demand assent to their ideas; they are teaching
the skills of inquiry, not particular conclusions.45 Student performance is
36

See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2000).

37

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

See Bowie, supra note 9, at 21; Steven D. Smith, “Fixed Star” or Twin Star? The Ambiguity of
Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 801 (2019).
38

39 See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 213 (1983) (“[A] system of rewards and punishments is available to reinforce
the messages” of the school).
40 See Bowie, supra note 9, at 6 (“the government [may] . . . require a student to take an
objectionable math test”).
41

See id. at 40 (“Teachers force students to recite poetry.”).

42

Redish & Finnerty, supra note 19, at 64.

43

See Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1981).

Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of
Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 183 (1996).
44

45 See Diane Ravitch, Celebrating America, in PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE: THE POLITICS OF
PATRIOTISM IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 91, 92 (Joel Westheimer ed., 2007) (arguing that to teach patriotism
“narrowly, as jingoistic, uncritical self-praise of our nation . . . would be indoctrination rather than
education.”); Hugh Sockett, The Moral Aspects of the Curriculum, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
CURRICULUM, supra note 2, at 543, 550–51 (describing and critiquing the practice of “values clarification”
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assessed not based upon what opinions students articulate, but whether they
can back those opinions with open-mindedness, logic, and well-marshalled
fact and argument. This kind of claim, however, should not be taken at face
value. It may be true, especially in the teaching of history and social studies,
that teachers do not demand student assent to all their claims; but there will
almost always exist some claims to which assent is required. Some
orthodoxies, after all, are deeply held, and those who hold them may believe
that there are no good arguments to the contrary. The reality of evolution is
such an orthodoxy, in most quarters; so is antiracism. If logic and evidence
compel these beliefs, then students who refuse to assent will face negative
consequences.
Like the articulation of orthodoxies, compelled assent is not a necessary
feature of schools; it is merely a ubiquitous one. Neill’s Summerhill did not
give grades, nor did it assess student work in any other fashion.46
But we have also come to understand that assessment and fear of
negative consequences are not the only possible mechanism of compelled
assent. Fifty years after Barnette, in the case of Lee v. Weisman,47 the Court
held that a school that had arranged for the delivery of short prayers at its
graduation ceremony had unconstitutionally established religion—even
though all that was asked of students was respectful silence, with no
participation in the prayer requested or demanded. This arrangement was
nevertheless judged to be deficient because it created “subtle coercive
pressure”—pressure of a sort that it is unreasonable to expect schoolchildren
to resist, even though we might expect adults to resist it.48 “This pressure,
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”49 Putting
students in a position where silence will be understood to be assent, so that
dissent must be actively articulated in order to be observed, is a coercive act,
the Court found. “Research in psychology supports the common assumption
that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social
convention.”50

as a method of moral instruction that focuses upon helping children to identify their values rather than
upon the content of those values, in order to avoiding “coerc[ing]” students in this area “by grades or
punishments”); Sawchuk, supra note 20 (quoting educational expert Jonathan Zimmerman: “Our goal
should not be to get anyone to have a certain view of America, but that is in fact what most history tries
to do. . . . The problem is the contradiction between a lot of the democratic rhetoric many of us use in
class, and the actual practice, which tends to be flag-waving.”).
46

See NEILL, supra note 23, at 25.

47

505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).

48

Id. at 592.

49

Id. at 593.

50

Id.
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To be sure, Weisman is an Establishment Clause case, and the coercion
at issue was religious coercion. But to the extent that coerced assent to any
orthodoxy is prohibited, the reasoning of Weisman applies to any orthodoxy
presented in a fashion that makes silence likely be read as assent. As Abner
Greene has ably argued, “the majority opinion in Weisman does not rely
primarily on the structural Establishment Clause argument. It rests instead on
equating psychological coercion with legal coercion in the public school
setting.”51 Therefore, Greene concludes, Weisman plus the orthodoxy
prohibition of Barnette should prohibit teacher-led group recitations of the
Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, even if opting out is explicitly
allowed.52 Likewise, any claim for which there is no unanimity, but for which
there is nevertheless strong local consensus and a social expectation of
conformity, might count as compelled speech as soon as it is presented as
true by a school. This would be so even if no test, no grade, no
recommendation letter depends upon a student’s articulated agreement.
Moreover, Weisman’s understanding of compulsion applies even more
strongly to the many unarticulated ideological positions that shape school life
than to those messages which schools communicate formally. A school’s
“[i]ndoctrination can be explicit or tacit.”53
C.

Schools Compel Attendance

Compulsory schooling is a policy considerably younger than the
Republic, but one that was fully entrenched in American educational practice
by the time of Barnette. “By 1916, . . . compulsory attendance had become
effectively a national policy despite the absence of a federal government
role.”54 Although early compulsory attendance laws were ill-enforced and
aspirational in character, enforcement was generally strong by the 1920s and
“by the 1950s secondary-school attendance had become so customary that
school-leavers were routinely seen as ‘dropouts.’”55 Indeed, compulsory
schooling was one of the key policy planks of the Progressive education
movement discussed in Part II. Elementary and secondary education, urged
the Progressives, should not be the province of the rich, or dependent upon

51

Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 454 (1995).

52

Id. at 452–53.

53

BERNER, supra note 33, at 8.

TRACY STEFFES, SCHOOL, SOCIETY, AND STATE: A NEW EDUCATION TO GOVERN MODERN
AMERICA, 1890–1940, 3–4 (2012). It is common to date fully nationwide compulsory education to 1918.
E.g., Adriana Lleras-Muney, Were Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws Effective? An Analysis
from 1915 to 1939, 45 J. L. & ECON. 401, 403 (2002).
54

55 Lleras-Muney, supra note 54, at 403; David Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of
Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 355, 359 (1976).
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the elective choices of parents who might value it; it should be the common
birthright of all children, and therefore compulsory.56 Americans retain fealty
to this principle today.57
The institution of compulsory schooling means that speech that schools
compel is compelled particularly forcefully: the state not only requires people
to listen and then speak in particular ways in a given setting, but compels
them to be present in that setting.58 Students forced to speak in school
experience compulsion in a context where their autonomy has already been
sacrificed to state interests.
The military is the only other major American institution similarly
structured. Military service can be compelled, and military personnel are then
subject to codes of conduct and behavior that require not only substantive but
ritualized speech, such as the salute of officers.59 But most individuals have
never been drafted. Nearly everyone who was a child in the United States, by
contrast, was a schoolchild, and the overwhelming majority attended public
schools. Compulsory schooling also occupies many years, a great deal longer
than most servicepersons’ military terms. Public school is the site of
Americans’ shared experience of the government, with the force of law,
demanding that they spend long periods attending institutions where they will
then be told what to say.
One should not be misled, as Justice Frankfurter is in his Barnette
dissent, into claiming that public school students are not compelled to speak

56 BOB PEPPERMAN TAYLOR, HORACE MANN’S TROUBLING LEGACY: THE EDUCATION OF
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS 33–34 (2010); Tyack, supra note 55, at 363.
57 E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society.”).
58 See YUDOF, supra note 34, at 213 (arguing that First Amendment concerns are heightened in
schools because of the “existence of a captive audience”).
59 There are several other instances where individuals other than students and soldiers are forced
to participate in a government institution which then requires them to speak. These include compulsions
applied to persons under the jurisdiction of the penal system, requirements that persons seeking licenses
to drive provide information about themselves, demands that persons disclose personal information to tax
and census authorities, obligations imposed upon public companies publicly to file financial statements,
and duties to report some types of criminal activity to the state. Volokh, supra note 28, at 357, 359 n.29,
380; Bowie, supra note 9, at 24, 40 (“The list is endless.”). Courts also compel people to present
themselves, and there to speak as directed—often notwithstanding their strong preference to remain silent
regarding the topics they are asked to address. And when they do speak, they are required to tell the truth.
But they are not required in so doing to endorse an idea or principle that has been chosen by government.
See Bowie, supra note 9, at 40.

Professor Volokh properly distinguishes these cases from those where the state has “extra power” to
compel speech from persons who have entered into voluntary relationships with it. His examples are
tenants leasing government property, state employees, and broadcasters. Volokh, supra note 28, at 359;
see also Bowie, supra note 9, at 30–31.
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because they have a right to opt out.60 Frankfurter appears to have thought
that, because students have the right to exit public schools in favor of private
ones that do not and cannot be forced to subscribe to any given government
orthodoxy, public school students expected to endorse any such orthodoxy
are not in fact compelled. Rather, having chosen to attend a public school
rather than a private one, they should be understood voluntarily to have
accepted its rules.61
To the contemporary eye, this is clearly wrong. Frankfurter is unmoved
by the obvious fact that public schools are free to students while private
schools must be privately paid.62 To him, such a student still “takes
advantage” of the school’s “opportunities” and therefore should not be
allowed to “refuse compliance with its conditions.”63 Today’s law, however,
treats free, public education as a right of the individual and its provision as a
constitutional duty of the state.64 For us moderns, therefore, a student who
exercises his right to obtain free state-supported education and is then told he
must therefore waive First Amendment rights faces a straightforwardly
unconstitutional condition. Similarly, Frankfurter does not consider the
likelihood that for some dissenters, the market will provide no private option.
If one’s views are idiosyncratic, the market will not generally make available
a private school that reflects those views. To require such a person
nevertheless to attend some school and follow its speech rules is, again, an
unconstitutional condition.
A deeper problem with Frankfurter’s view of choice and compulsion is
that the state may require private as well as public schools to teach nationalist
principles and to inculcate patriotic feeling. To be sure, West Virginia’s
Pledge requirement applied only to its public schools.65 But decades before
Barnette, the Court had made it clear that West Virginia could have applied
it to its private schools as well. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court had
set aside an Oregon statute requiring all students to attend public rather than
private school.66 “No question is raised,” says the Court in that case,
“concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, . . . [or]
60 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656, 657–58 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925)).
61 Id. at 656 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535). For further discussion of Frankfurter’s use of Pierce
in his Barnette dissent, see infra Part III.
62 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 657 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). That attendance is not optional is noted
by the majority. Id. at 632.
63

Id. at 656.

64

See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915, 936–38

(2016).
65

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 n.2.

66

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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to require . . . that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.”67 To require the Pledge or some similar exercise in private schools
would therefore not have then seemed to qualify as an “unreasonable
restrictio[n]” imposed upon a private school program.68 If the West Virginia
statute may compel the Pledge in public schools, it is hard to see why a
different statute could not similarly compel it in private ones.
II. A PROGRESSIVE PEDAGOGY FOR THE TEACHING OF CIVICS
A.

Barnette Relies upon a Teleological Theory of Free Expression in
Schools

Part I establishes that it does plaintiffs like the Barnettes little good to
say that the state may not establish orthodoxies or compel assent thereto.
Such establishments and such compulsions are the bread and butter of every
public school that either party and any contemporaneous court might have
known or imagined. Schoolchildren who are forced to speak need instead a
theory of compelled speech specific to school. Given that the public school
has both a teaching mission and is an organ of the state, we need to know
what kinds of speech schools may compel. Another way to state this question
is to ask: Given that schools by their nature must violate what the First
Amendment would otherwise require regarding compelled speech, how far
does that exception extend?
Barnette offers an answer. It appears in Justice Jackson’s rebuttal to
Justice Frankfurter’s argument that for the Court to specify what kinds of
educational exercises schools may and may not compel “would in effect
make us [the Court] the school board for the country.”69 Not so, responds
Jackson. “Boards of Education . . . have, of course, important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights.”70 Moreover, Jackson continues, “[t]hat they [the
boards] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
67 Id. at 534. It is possible to read the phrase “no question is raised” as one that limits the scope of
the holding, rather than as dictum that permits the regulation of private schools for patriotic purposes. This
is neither the stronger nor the conventional reading.
68

Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940). Justin Driver reports that “no single
passage in Gobitis drew more ire” from the public than this one. JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE
GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 7 (2018).
69

70

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (1943).
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strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes.”71
The first of these two sentences is properly read as a straightforward
declaration that students have constitutional rights even in school.72 But, as
we have seen, this claim does little work for pupils like the Barnettes, given
that schools will routinely find themselves unable to honor students’
preference not to speak. So what is the extent of the right to free expression
that students enjoy? Which compulsions must they obey and which do they
have the right to refuse? It is the second sentence that offers a reply. It
suggests that a school may compel speech only when doing so is consistent
with the purpose of school. That purpose is to “educat[e] the young for
citizenship” in a democracy that honors constitutional values. The forced
salute and declaration of allegiance that West Virginia sought to compel
undermines that purpose: it teaches youth a lesson diametrically opposed to
the one that should be taught.
Part of the problem is hypocrisy, a vice to which children everywhere
are keenly sensitive. A democratic school, in order effectively to train
students to be fair and just, must treat them justly and fairly; an American
school, seeking effectively to teach students that the Constitution is the
highest legal authority, must respect it. If the flag of the United States stands
for a Republic that honors the freedom of religion and of expression, it is
paradoxical and hypocritical for the government to force someone to pledge
allegiance to it unwillingly (especially, though not only, when her objections
are religious). This paradox and hypocrisy naturally would lead students to
conclude that the principles that the flag symbolizes are not taken seriously
by those who would require them to venerate it. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, in its opinion in the Gobitis case, includes a long string citation to
what it calls “students of educational psychology” who make precisely this
point.73 A compelled Pledge is not just a violation of rights, but a pedagogical
failure. And educationally, it is not merely ineffective, “strangl[ing] the free
mind,” but counterproductive, “teach[ing] youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes.”74
71

Id.

For an account of Barnette that focuses on this holding, see DRIVER, supra note 62, at 67
(describing Barnette as holding that “it was essential that schools honor the constitutional rights of their
students.”).
72

73 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683, 691 (3d Cir. 1939). On the credibility of
these “students,” see infra note 183 and accompanying text.
74 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. Several of the sources that the Third Circuit’s opinion in Gobitis
quotes make the point pithily. For example:

[C]ompelling a child to salute the flag . . . generates resentment, and is calculated to produce a
precisely antithetical result to that which was planned by the authors of the flag-saluting ceremony.
A salute to the flag under such circumstances is an affront to the principles for which the flag stands.
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A rule that rejects government hypocrisy when compelling student
speech, moreover, does not extend to the vast catalogue of compelled assents
to beliefs that the state has determined to be true, compulsions that are part
of schools’ educational mission. The Third Circuit’s Gobitis opinion makes
this distinction, between the Pledge and other kinds of school-compelled
assent, whether curricular or normative, explicit:
The abstract problem postulated concerns the effectiveness
of teaching love (of country) by force emanating from the
would-be beloved (an administrative instrumentality of that
country). We do not doubt that children can and have been
forced to learn Latin or eat spinach and so eventually to love
them. But this pedagogical victory has more often than not
been won at the price of resentment towards the
disciplinarian. In our particular circumstance, then, that
resentment clashes with and cancels the very affection
sought to be instilled.75
But it reads Barnette too narrowly to understand its rule to allow public
schools to compel speech in any instance that does not involve civic
hypocrisy. For one thing, such a rule fails to reach varieties of compelled
speech that ought clearly to be seen as out of bounds. It may be hypocritical
to compel an unwilling student to “pledge allegiance to the flag,” but there is
no hypocrisy in commanding a student, for example, to sing the praises of
the sitting president. The latter compulsion is baldly partisan, but not
hypocritical. It is on account of its partisanship that it ought to join the forced
Pledge in the set of compulsions from which students are protected.
More basically, Barnette means to do much more than simply inveigh
against hypocrisy. It presents a teleological account of the public school.76
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683, 691 (3d Cir. 1939) (quoting William N. Hensley, The
Constitutional Aspects of Compulsory Pledges of Allegiance and Salutes to the American Flag, THE
LAWYER, Nov. 1939, at 5, 10).
75 Gobitis, 108 F.2d at 691 (emphasis added). To be sure, eating spinach is a less apt example than
learning Latin; eating is conduct, not speech.
76 The Barnettes’ brief urged that the purpose of schooling be a key factor in the Court’s analysis.
Notably, the brief deployed purpose as the best way to distinguish schools from the military, which, as I
note supra in the text accompanying note 59, is the other primary government space where people are
simultaneously compelled to be present and to speak:

[Appellants] may suggest that the necessities of discipline require universal enforcement even if this
means driving the children out of school. Such a position is, of course, familiar in military life. There
coercion is often reasonable and necessary, since the very function of a military unit requires implicit
and uniform obedience; and to obtain this, all non-compliance with orders, reasonable or
unreasonable, must be firmly dealt with in furtherance of the very purpose for which the unit exists.
The fallacy of attempting to apply this analogy to school life lies in the difference between the
purposes of school education and the purposes of an army. The function of an army is to fight, and
for that very reason to achieve a disciplined and regimented organization. But the purpose of
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What is the purpose of the public school? To create good citizens. What are
good citizens like? They have “free minds,” to be sure. Equally important,
however, is that they understand that “important principles of our
government” are not “mere platitudes”; rather, they are the sacred
commitments of every member of the polity. Why, then, can a public school
not compel the Pledge? Because such a compulsion is bad education for
citizenship. This is not just because such a compulsion undermines the
likelihood that citizens-in-training will come to believe that this nation takes
freedom of expression seriously. It is also because the job of the school is to
create adults who are capable, as citizens, of effectively and freely expressing
their views. To reach these goals, schools cannot merely tell students about
free expression; they must provide some scope for students to exercise, or,
more precisely, to practice exercising, their expressive rights. They must
proceed “by persuasion and example.”77 Civic education, to be effective,
must in substantial part involve learning by doing.
The aggregation of students perforce creates communities. Indeed, the
school is very often its students’ primary social community. Barnette is
proposing that a common school community must operate, at least some of
the time, as a miniature state with respect to student rights.78 Such a
community still has license often to be authoritarian—more authoritarian,
surely, than the state itself—because it is teaching.79 But, as part of that
teaching, and in part to counteract its inherent authoritarianism,80 the school
must simultaneously function as a democratic site where free expression is
modeled and practiced. Schooling in the United States must mean enacting
constitutional rights in the miniature society of the school, so as to teach
children how to be citizens of that larger society. Students learn about their
American schools is primarily to impart knowledge and to prepare for life under free institutions.
The purpose is not to turn out a regimented group seasoned to coercive methods.
Brief for Appellee at 51, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591), 1943 WL
71856, at *51.
77 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640; see also R. FREEMAN BUTTS, THE CIVIC MISSION IN EDUCATIONAL
REFORM: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE PUBLIC AND THE PROFESSION 155 (1989) (Good citizenship must “come
about by persuasion and example but not by imposition of any ideological discipline nor by a compulsion
that ‘invades the sphere of intellect and spirit.’ Such study is a proper and necessary means of maintaining
political cohesion, loyalty, and patriotism.”).
78 Whether schools should also allow students to participate in school governance is a more
complex question. See Karen Seashore Louis, Democratic Values, Democratic Schools, in DEMOCRATIC
LEARNING: THE CHALLENGE TO SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS 74, 82–83 (John MacBeath & Lejf Moos eds.,
2004).
79 See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 94 (rev. ed. 1999) (“The most democratic
schools . . . do not look like miniature societies, at least not like miniature democratic societies: teachers
have much more authority, both formal and informal, than democratic legislators have, or ideally should
have.”).
80 John Merrow, Youth, Media, and Citizenship, in INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 188, 201 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds., 2005).
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rights by being members of a community where those rights can be and are
exercised. They learn about freedom to dissent because their community
allows them to practice dissent.
This teleological approach, focused upon the pedagogy of rights rather
than upon rights themselves, makes it possible to distinguish between speech
that schools may compel and speech that they may not. Compulsion is
permitted if it serves the creation of good citizens, but not otherwise. Thus,
students must be given room to refuse to agree that the flag deserves their
allegiance. To do otherwise not only undermines the teaching of the value of
free expression, but deprives them of the learning opportunity to choose
dissent. Likewise, for the same reasons, assent cannot be compelled to
partisan, political, religious, or nationalistic claims.81 On the other hand,
students may and should be expected to agree to facts and widely accepted
theories, or at least to dissent in ways that respect argument and evidence.
That is because an effective citizen is educated, informed, and analytical.
Furthermore, students may also be expected to assent, and to conform their
behavior, to ethical and even political maxims widely held in society: that
good citizens are honest, tolerant of others, and respectful of their persons
and of their rights.
The principle of learning citizenship by doing echoes in American legal
history from Barnette in both directions through time. Dean Martha Minow
has traced it back to at least the mid-nineteenth century. She describes the
suit of a black man against Massachusetts, filed in order to obtain integrated
education:
His lawyers, including a leading white anti-slavery advocate,
frame[d] a challenge to the legislated segregation and made
the radical argument to the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
“The school is the little world where the child is trained for
the larger world of life, and therefore it must cherish and
develop the virtues and the sympathies needed in the larger
world.”82
The school, these advocates already understood, is a “little world,” one
which should be composed based upon the same values that we would expect
in composing a larger, adult polity, including the values of equality and equal
opportunity.
The most direct expression in the United States Reports of the learningby-doing principle of civic education appears in Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, decided a quarter-century after Barnette. Tinker concerns several
81

See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.

Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 599, 610 (2008).
82
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teenagers who refused the demand of their school principal that they remove
black armbands that they had worn to protest American military involvement
in Vietnam.83 Their subsequent experience tracked that of the Barnette
children: suspension from school, litigation, and ultimate arrival at the
Supreme Court of the United States.84 Barnette is thus a counterpart as well
as a forerunner of Tinker: Barnette concerns which varieties of speech
schools may not compel, and Tinker which varieties of speech schools must
permit.
It is therefore unsurprising that the two opinions are quite similar.
Tinker, like Barnette, is famous for a ringing declaration: “It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”85 Tinker also
includes the oft-quoted maxim that “state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism.”86 Again like Barnette, these ringing declarations
do little to help decide the case, beyond saying that schools’ authority is not
absolute. So Tinker provides a rule: school officials may restrict or punish
student speech, said the Court, only if they reasonably forecast that the speech
would “materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” or “collid[e] with the
rights of others.”87 The interference or collision must be substantial; it cannot
be a pretext for school officials’ desire to “avoid . . . controversy which might
result” from the speech.88
The effect of this rule, the Justices understood well, was to create a zone
in which students would learn about their rights by practicing their exercise—
the same tactic the Court used in Barnette. It might be that nearly all verbal
speech undesired by teachers could be prohibited in classrooms during
“classroom hours.”89 Such speech is a “substantia[l] interfer[ence]” with
schools’ pedagogical mission.90 But speech “in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours” when class is
not in session must be permitted, so long as it is not likely seriously to
disrupt.91

83

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).

84

See id. at 504–05.

85

Id. at 506.

86

Id. at 511.

87

Id. at 513 (internal citation omitted).

88

Id. at 510.

Id. at 512. Passive speech, such as the Tinkers’ armbands, must be permitted even during class
if not disruptive.
89
90

Id. at 513.

91

Id. at 512–13.
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As in Barnette, this zone of expression is necessary not so much because
it prevents rights from being violated—such an argument is circular—but
because effective education for citizenship requires learning by doing. The
Court itself has noted that a pedagogical imperative lies behind its treatment
of student expression in school: “The process of educating our youth for
citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the
civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order.”92 And both observers contemporary to Tinker and those today
understand Tinker to require such an experiential civic pedagogy.93 As the
editors of the Harvard Law Review summarized the case in 1969:
The holding in Tinker established a principle of educational
philosophy based on the first amendment…. The Court
stressed that personal intercommunication among students
outside the classroom is one of the activities to which the
schools are dedicated…. In short, the Court adopted the view
that the process of education in a democracy must be
democratic. 94
The Review’s editors were perspicacious. They not only understood that
Tinker relied upon a theory of democratic education, but recognized that
theory as the same one that drove the holding of Barnette, decided “over
twenty-five years ago.”95 They also correctly identified the pedagogical roots
of that theory. For the principle that “the process of education in a democracy
must be democratic,” the editors cited John Dewey.96

92

Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (emphasis added).

For an example in the current literature, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave their First
Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 532 (2000)
(“Instead of seeing protecting student expression as in tension with the mission of schools, Justice Fortas
[writing for the Court in Tinker] regards safeguarding speech as a crucial part of educating students about
the Constitution.”). Dean Chemerinsky’s article also exemplifies the contemporary trend in the literature
to treat Tinker as implicitly overruled, or at least cabined beyond utility. This argument relies on the fact
that all subsequent student speech cases to reach the Court have been decided in favor of censorious school
districts, even though they involve school officials who can often seem both reflexively authoritarian and
remarkably thin-skinned. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401–02 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675. But I read these cases’ efforts to distinguish
Tinker as genuine. Tinker’s core holding, that non-disruptive political speech in school is not an empty
set, and can neither be banned nor punished, retains its vitality.
93

94

Political Protest in Public Schools, 83 HARV. L. REV. 154, 159 (1969).

95

Id. at 159 n.32.

96

Id. at 159 & n.32 (citing JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
343–47 (1916)).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

784

FIU Law Review
B.

[Vol. 13:765

Civic Education in the Progressive Tradition

The two ideas central to Barnette—that the fundamental goal of schools
is educate children for responsible citizenship, and that schools should do so
using an experiential pedagogy—are very much of their time. The principle
that educating citizens is the task, even the primary task, of public schools
was foundational for the common school movement, whose ambitious
campaign to remake American primary and secondary education began in the
middle of the nineteenth century and had enjoyed remarkable success by the
time the Barnettes confronted their school’s principal. This idea was shared
by and expanded upon by John Dewey, whose influential thinking was part
of the intellectual culture of America in the first half of the twentieth century.
Dewey also became the leading expositor of Barnette’s second idea: that
democratic education should involve not only teaching about democracy but
the experience of democracy.
Since before the founding of the Republic, American schools have
understood their role as teaching good citizenship. But the dominant
understanding in those early years was that good citizenship flowed
straightforwardly from good morals.97 Moreover, the schools of the era were
hyperlocal, haphazard, and discretionary.98 “During the middle decades of
the nineteenth century,” write David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, a
movement arose to urge a system of common schools that would upend these
realities. These schools would be “free, financed by local and state
government, controlled by lay boards of education, mixing all social groups
under one roof, and offering education of such quality that no parent would
desire private schooling.”99
Reformers’ dedication to public governance, universal availability, no
fees, compulsory education, and the mixing of social groups within a single
institution all reflect a genuine commitment to equality in educational
opportunity—at least relative to the system they sought to change.100 But
97 Julie Reuben, Patriotic Purposes: Public Schools and the Education of Citizens, in
INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 5 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin
Lazerson eds., 2005).
98

Id.; STEFFES, supra note 54, at 122–23.

DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE: PUBLIC SCHOOL LEADERSHIP
AMERICA, 1820–1980, at 30 (1st ed. 1982); accord Diane Ravitch, Education and Democracy, in
MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY 15, 15 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti
eds., 2001).
99

IN

100 STEFFES, supra note 54, at 2; Salomone, supra note 44, at 174. Dewey shared these
commitments. See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF EDUCATION 87 (1916). Regarding the very real limits of the Progressives’ egalitarianism, see, e.g.,
DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA: A CENTURY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORM
24–25 (1st ed. 1995); CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 137 (1st ed. 1983) (“Public common schooling was indeed devoted to moral

2019]

Deconstitutionalizing Dewey

785

these commitments flowed equally from deep springs of paternalistic and
authoritarian attitudes. Advocates of the common school understood
themselves to be involved in an explicitly political undertaking. Common
schools were above all a political necessity, advocated “both among those
who pointed out the dangers of an uneducated mob and among those who
argued that political equality demanded trained intelligence.”101 A state
governed by its citizens faced failure if those citizens lacked correct
intellectual and moral predispositions, if they could be bought, or if they were
unaware of “what the citizen of a free republic ought to know.”102
Common schools, therefore, sought to create a particular kind of citizen:
informed, loyal, and patriotic, but also homogenized, complaisant, and
tractable.103 Proponents of common schooling like Horace Mann explicitly
sought to manufacture citizens who despite class differences would be
politically similar to one another, and would share a single patriotic
loyalty.104 The poor, and the potential moral failings that might arise in
impoverished environments if unchecked, particularly worried Mann and his
contemporaries.105 Later, as the twentieth century began, similar concerns
were expressed with respect to the large number of immigrant children,
including many Catholics, whose families and church schools elites
suspected were neither willing nor able to teach children to be good
Americans.106
The idea that the common schools, by creating the right kind of citizens,
could “safeguard [both] the democratic freedom of the individual and the
stability of the democratic state” “came to the forefront of public discussion
during and after World War I.”107 The war itself had made vivid the need for
stability. Concerns about immigration and partisanship only increased in the
lead-up to World War II. The required recitals of the Pledge of Allegiance

education and discipline. Textbooks glorified American politics and social relations, and they often
perpetuated demeaning ideas about immigrants and racist ideas about nonwhites.”).
101

TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 99, at 54; TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 7, 34.

TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 99, at 54; TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 26; MARIS A. VINKOVIS,
EDUCATION, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PERSISTENT
ISSUES 92–103 (1995).
102

103 See DAVID NASAW, SCHOOLED TO ORDER: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PUBLIC SCHOOLING IN THE
UNITED STATES 41 (1st ed. 1979) (“The republicanism represented . . . was a republicanism that
emphasized the need for public obedience rather than public participation.”).
104

TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 61–62.

See WILLIAM J. REESE, POWER AND THE PROMISE OF SCHOOL REFORM: GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENTS DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 11 (1986).
105

106 Reuben, supra note 97, at 9, 11; Phillip Buckley, Conceptions of Childhood, Student Rights,
and the Citizenship Crusade: Meyer, Pierce, and the Pledge of Allegiance Cases, 8 J. HISTORY
CHILDHOOD & YOUTH 254, 256–57 (2015).
107

STEFFES, supra note 54, at 5.
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that began to pop up between the world wars were unequivocally part of this
program.108
Although Barnette of course rejects the compelled Pledge, it embraces
unequivocally the common-school principle that the purpose of public
schools is to educate the public citizen, with respect both to knowledge and
to values. “National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion
and example is not in question.”109 Barnette bases its entire approach upon
the mission of schools being to “educat[e] the young for citizenship”; that is
the “reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual.”110
It is important to recognize that Gobitis, the decision that Barnette so
roundly overruled, shares with Barnette its understanding of the centrality of
the civic purpose of education. Justice Frankfurter writes in Gobitis that the
compelled Pledge occurs during “the formative period in the development of
citizenship.”111 When school authorities compel the recital of Pledge, what
they “are really asserting is the right to awaken in the child’s mind
considerations as to the significance of the flag contrary to those implanted
by the parent.”112 Gobitis framed the issue it was to decide as whether schools
may provide “for this universal gesture of respect for the symbol of our
national life in the setting of the common school.”113 To Frankfurter, it is “in
the setting of the common school” where civic duty must be taught. The
Barnette opinion endorses this view. Indeed, Barnette explicitly notes the
commonality, quoting the Gobitis dissent on the principles it shared with the
Gobitis majority:
As the present CHIEF JUSTICE said in dissent in the Gobitis
case, the State may “require teaching by instruction and
study of all in our history and in the structure and
organization of our government, including the guaranties of
civil liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of
country.”114
Where Gobitis and Barnette part ways is whether means matter, or only
ends. Gobitis argues that the scope of permissible compulsions in schools
should be determined by the weight of the public goals for the achievement
108 Buckley, supra note 106, at 257 (“Starting in 1919, in response to increasing calls for the
teaching of citizenship and patriotism, the number of schools implementing” compelled patriotic recitals
rapidly increased).
109

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).

110

Id. at 637 (emphasis added).

111

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940).
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Id. at 599 (echoing Progressive concerns over leaving civic education to individual families).
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Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
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Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631.
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of which the state had enlisted the school system. In the midst of a second
world war, into which the United States was imminently to be drawn, Justice
Frankfurter and his colleagues saw social cohesion as a paramount need of
the nation.115 The issue posed by the compulsory flag salute is “whether the
legislatures of the various states and the authorities in a thousand counties
and school districts of this country are barred from determining the
appropriateness of various means to evoke that unifying sentiment without
which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or religious.”116 Given the
importance of the goal, Frankfurter concluded, these officials must be trusted
as to technique.
For the Barnette Court, and the Tinker Court as well, method matters as
much as goal, and learning by doing is the only appropriate method of civic
education. The two cases insist that the goal of creating citizens requires
public schools to define arenas in which students are permitted to exercise
their rights as citizens. This is a Progressive idea, but one that arose somewhat
later in the history of the movement. It is closely associated with John Dewey,
whose long career of writing and advocacy spanned the period from before
World War I through the Barnette decision.
Dewey urged that education of democratic citizens could be
accomplished only by organizing schools along democratic lines. His
program, as refracted through educators under his influence, was to give
students genuine agency and power over their own learning and within their
school communities. The key passage in Dewey’s writings, quoted and
requoted in the literature, calls for the school to be “a miniature community,
an embryonic society.”117 “When the school introduces and trains each child
of society into membership within such a little community,” Dewey
continues, “providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we
shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which is worthy,
lovely, and harmonious.”118
Dewey’s idea is simultaneously political and pedagogical. To him,
genuine pedagogy required active learning. Students do not learn passively,
115 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596 (“The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of
cohesive sentiment.”). See also The Gobitis Case in Retrospect, 1 BILL RTS. REV. 267, 267 (1941) (The
Gobitis “decision came at a time of exceptional emotion when the world staggered under the shock of the
impending fall of France, with the vast implications of that event.”). But see Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early
Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1952 (2016) (suggesting that
Frankfurter in Gobitis was less focused upon national security than is commonly assumed); id. at 1962,
1964 (noting that Justice Jackson and other anti-authoritarian voices understood protection of free
expression to be in support of the “nascent war effort”).
116

Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597.

JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 32 (1907). For quotations, see TYACK & HANSOT,
supra note 99, at 202; LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 94 (1977);
STEFFES, supra note 54, at 169.
117

118

DEWEY, supra note 117, at 44.
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by taking in information they are given, but through engaging in activity that
allows them to construct knowledge. This is true in every field of inquiry.119
But for Dewey, learning by doing embodied a political imperative as well.120
Only a school structured as a society in miniature can “foster democratic and
moral values through their overall organization and pedagogy.”121 In
Dewey’s vision, writes Tracy Steffes, “[t]raining of democratic citizens
would not come from abstract study of government or political obligations
but must be rooted in the social relations and experience of the school
itself.”122 David Tyack, the eminent educational historian, states that for
Dewey “[t]op-down management of a ‘democratic’ school system [is] . . . a
contradiction in terms. The processes of schooling,” Dewey thought, “should
be congruent with the character of the cooperative society Dewey sought to
achieve.”123
Barnette does not reference Dewey, nor does it make an explicit
reference to his ideas. But its conception of the school—restated for the
subsequent generation in Tinker—is right in line both with Dewey’s notion
of the embryonic community and his devotion to active learning. Barnette
and Tinker insist that schools must make room within their communities for
the exercise of expressive rights.124 That exercise is how students, actively,
will learn what their rights entail and why they are valuable. In that exercise,
in that experience, students will learn what it is to be democratic citizens.
III. SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO CONSTITUTIONALIZE
EDUCATIONAL PROGRESSIVISM?
In the decades since Barnette and Tinker, Progressivism in general, and
the Progressive pedagogy of Dewey in particular, have waxed and waned in
their centrality to the educational visions of both educators and of the
courts.125 In periods of conflict, most notably that of the Cold War, the idea
of learning by doing has been overshadowed by more traditional pedagogies
of frontal instruction and one-way knowledge transmission from teachers to
pupils.126 The experientialist classroom endorsed by Dewey has come to be
associated more with the schools of the privileged than with the understaffed
schools of the cities with whose students the early Progressives were so
119

Id. at 51–52.

120

Salomone, supra note 44, at 178.

121

STEFFES, supra note 54, at 169.

122

Id.
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TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 99, at 203.
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See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
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See NEL NODDINGS, PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 24 (4th ed. 2016).
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Salomone, supra note 44, at 178–79.
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concerned. Likewise, as noted above, the Supreme Court has retreated in its
experiential commitments since Barnette and Tinker, toward a much more
authoritarian vision of the ways that children and adults should relate to one
another in schools.127
These trends should not, however, eclipse the extent to which the core
tenets of the common school movement continued for decades after Barnette,
through Tinker and its progeny, and into today, to function as the underlying
ideology of American public schooling. Their influence is so widely and
deeply incorporated into the structure of American schools that it was (and
remains) often unnoticed; they are the enthymemes, too obvious to state, of
American schooling. The Progressive convictions that schools should be
universally accessible, free of charge, professionally run, and nonsectarian
have remained for a very long time the understood baseline of any
educational policy debate. The understanding that schools’ mission
prominently includes the creation of good citizens remains widely held.128
And Dewey’s claim that learning by doing is central to effective civic
education has also been widely internalized.129
In 1996, Professor Rosemary Salomone, noting these features of
American education, asked “whether the ‘common school’ concept has
continued applicability, given dramatic changes in the political, social, and
demographic landscape over the past century.”130 Salomone was concerned
with what she saw as an avulsive erosion of social consensus over values,
ideology, and morality within the polity. This erosion undermined the notion,
central to the common-school program, that there existed some set of
“neutral, nonsectarian” values and traits that should be taught and that would
then form the basis of citizenship.131
However beleaguered the “‘common school’ concept” was in 1996, it
seems positively endangered today. Social and civic disagreement has only
intensified. And interest in engaging those disagreements has declined: In the
contemporary educational scene, there seems to be less disagreement about
127

See sources cited supra note 93.

LAWRENCE CREMIN, PUBLIC EDUCATION 58 (1976) (“The public school has labored mightily
over the years to nurture certain common values and commitments . . . .”).
128

129 See GUTMANN, supra note 79, at 88–94; see generally THOMAS SERGIOVANNI, BUILDING
COMMUNITY IN SCHOOLS (1994). The claim also finds adherents among pedagogues outside of the United
States. See, e.g., Mats Ekholm, Learning Democracy by Sharing Power: The Student Role in Effectiveness
and Improvement, in DEMOCRATIC LEARNING, supra note 78, at 95, 97. It is likewise embraced by the
American private school sector, notwithstanding that private institutions, unconstrained by the First
Amendment, are free to be as authoritarian as they like. See, e.g., CHARLES L. GLENN, MUSLIM
EDUCATORS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 141 (2018).
130

Salomone, supra note 44, at 171.

Id. at 179–80. For a similar framing of the educational implications of social division, see
Nathan Glazer, Some Problems in Acknowledging Diversity, in MAKING GOOD CITIZENS 168, 168–69
(Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001).
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how to teach civics, or about what the content of civics education should be,
than whether to teach it at all.132 A lot of schools don’t bother.133
Even more dramatic, common schooling today is vulnerable for reasons
far removed from the erosion of consensus about the meaning of the good
and the elements of good citizenship. The United States is well along in a
process of abandoning the entire institutional scheme of common schooling,
the “conventional wisdom” that public schools should be common to all, free
of charge, and secular. The organizing principle of schooling in common is
being displaced by an ethic founded in markets and consumer sovereignty.134
At the organizational level, the most talked-about reforms of the past
two decades are school choice in general and charter schools in particular.135
Charter schools are precisely the opposite of common schools. The banner of
common schools is commonality: All students, regardless of background,
were to be schooled together and in the same way. The creed of charter
schools is consumerism: because students want and require different things,
there should be different institutions than can meet those multifarious
needs.136 Common schools, with a homogenizing mission, are naturally best
provided by government. Charter schools, letting a thousand flowers bloom,
can be provided only in a marketplace. The goal of the common schools is
good citizenship; the organizing principle of the charter movement is free
choice.137
Even with respect to public schools, traditionally organized and publicly
provided, the ideals of commonality are in retreat. The vision of Mann,
Dewey, and their many contemporaries was tainted by paternalism,
contaminated by religious prejudice, corrupted by nativism, and befouled by
racism. Nevertheless, they envisioned public schools that would undertake to
132

See Sawchuk, supra note 20.

See SARAH M. STITZLEIN, TEACHING FOR DISSENT: CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND POLITICAL
ACTIVISM 166–67 (2014).
133

134 See David F. Labaree, Consuming the Public School, 61 EDUC. THEORY 381, 391 (2011) (“The
American school system was a deliberate creation of the common school movement, but once the system
was set in motion, consumers rather than reformers became its driving force.”); Louis, supra note 78, at
78 (“Even relatively homogenous countries, such as Sweden, have enacted legislation supporting
alternatives to the previously unassailable ‘common school.’”).
135 Contemporary reforms other than charters also challenge the conventions of common
schooling. These notably include publicly funded vouchers for private school attendance, see Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), and tax benefits for private payments that defer the tuition expenses
of K–12 students attending private schools. See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 529(c)(7) (2019);
Hillel Y. Levin, Tax Credit Scholarship Programs and the Changing Ecology of Public Education, 5
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1048 (2013).
136 See Julian R. Betts, The Economic Theory of School Choice, in GETTING CHOICE RIGHT:
ENSURING EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN EDUCATION POLICY 14, 20–21 (Julian R. Betts & Tom Loveless
eds., 2005).
137 See Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, the Establishment Clause, and the Neoliberal Turn in
Public Education, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163, 1173–74 (2013).
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increase equality and fellow-feeling in the United States. The common school
was to tamp down the effects of the diversity of origins and of families,
counteract the potential for tribalism, and create a unifying influence. Today,
the dominant understanding of American public schools is that they
reinscribe and intensify, rather than mitigate, tribalism and inequality. Public
schools, in both the academic and the popular consciousness, are the central
institution that allows a deeply unequal system to replicate itself. They divide
children into educational castes, to the systematic advantage of the children
of those the system already favors.138
In short, Americans today believe less in common schooling than they
ever have. Prominent voices in the educational community reject it nearly
point by point. Living in such a reality, how should we read cases like
Barnette and Tinker, which not only treat Progressive education as a
desideratum but transform it into a constitutional requirement?
One approach is to double down on Barnette’s move as one needed more
than ever in a time when Progressivism is in deep disfavor. The First
Amendment, after all, by its text properly applies to all persons, including
schoolchildren. If we must carve out public schools as a glaring exception, a
zone in which freedom of expression is necessarily severely attenuated, we
need both a justification and a limiting principle. The Progressives generally,
and Dewey in particular, offer both. They offer not just any justification, but
one supported by a rich democratic (and distinctively American) theory.
They offer not just any principle, but one designed to be democracyenhancing even as it is pedagogically sound. “The educational standard
dictated by democratic values,” writes Amy Gutmann, is to “democratize
schools to the extent necessary to cultivate the . . . virtues of democratic
character.”139 It is to Dewey, Gutmann attests, that we owe our understanding
that a “substantial degree of democracy within schools will be useful,
probably even necessary . . . to creating democratic citizens.”140
The educational theory of the Progressives is, in short, smart,
theoretically compelling, full of practical wisdom, and an instantiation of
constitutional values. These many virtues—given that we need some way to
enforce the First Amendment in the unusual circumstances of public
schools—offer a constitutional line that is reasonable and right-thinking.
To articulate this view differently: Barnette is valuable today because
both Dewey and Jackson were right. Dewey articulated a theory grounded in
the constitutional values of liberty, freedom, and ordered government.
138 MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK
23–26 (2010); JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND
THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 104–05 (2010).
139

GUTMANN, supra note 79, at 94.

140

Id.
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Jackson recognized that the application of the Bill of Rights in public schools
required such a theory. Civic developments that move American schooling
away from the ideals of the Progressives are, like the heavy-handed
imposition of patriotic ritual by the legislature in West Virginia, deviations
from constitutional principle which it is the task of constitutional law to
correct.
But this argument falters. Even if Dewey was right in his time, perhaps
he was not right for all time. Dewey himself noted that the program of
Progressive education was in large part determined by the technological and
economic realities that characterized the polity it sought to educate.141 Today,
we again live in a period of very rapid technological change. In particular,
the move of education (along with everything else) to the internet is more
compatible with organizations based upon consumer sovereignty than upon
common schools.142
Even in his own time, Dewey’s views stemmed from his various
philosophical and political commitments; they were, in other words,
ideological. And perhaps ideology ought not be constitutionalized.
The first voice to advance this argument is Justice Frankfurter’s,
dissenting in Barnette. In Gobitis, writing for a majority, Frankfurter could
purport to maintain judicial agnosticism regarding how best to teach “loyalty
to . . . democracy.”143 But, transformed into a dissenter a few years later, he
found it necessary but insufficient to argue that pedagogical technique should
be left to legislatures. Frankfurter sought in addition to demonstrate that
Progressive ideology was contingent, and that it conflicted with other
important values. His dissent therefore emphasizes students’ power to choose
whether to attend public or private schools. Frankfurter argues that any
compulsion to which students are subject in state schools is constitutionally
unproblematic, because students have freely chosen to subject themselves to
it.144
As noted above, this particular claim jars contemporary ears, insensible
as it is to the fact that private schools are neither universally available nor
free of charge.145 But Frankfurter’s broader claim, that Progressive
educational thought and liberty are at odds, resonates today. Indeed,
Frankfurter’s arguments bear striking similarities to contemporary

141

See DEWEY, supra note 117, at 44 (noting the importance of technological change).

See PAUL E. PETERSON, SAVING SCHOOLS: FROM HORACE MANN TO VIRTUAL LEARNING
253–54 (2010).
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Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940).

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656–57 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence, scholarship, and advocacy regarding school choice.146
Frankfurter recognizes the reality that public and private education are
substitute goods.147 He anticipates the modern observation that families who
choose private schools are burdened by having to pay twice: once with their
taxes in support of public schools they do not use, and again with their tuition
to support the alternative which, having rejected the public system, the state
requires them to find.148 More basically, Frankfurter relies149 heavily upon
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Court held that liberty “excludes any
general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.”150 The right to exit public schools in
favor of private alternatives, says Pierce, is protected as a matter of “the
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose.”151
Pierce’s claim that school choice is a central component of liberty—a
view shared by many school choice advocates today152—is in tension with
the agenda of Progressives in Mann’s tradition, who sought to make all
schooling “common.”153 By relying heavily upon it, Frankfurter implies that

146 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (noting that the use of state funds
by religious schools does not violate First Amendment if government funds arrive at those schools “wholly
as a result of [private families’] own genuine and independent private choice”); Stephen D. Sugarman,
Using Private Schools to Promote Public Values, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 176–77 (associating
compulsion with having no educational choices other than public school).
147

See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 656–57.

Id. at 657 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Sugarman, supra note 146, at 181 (arguing that
private school parents “pay twice” for school and then relieve the public schools of the duty to educate
them). Frankfurter deploys this observation differently than us moderns. Today, the argument is about the
unfairness of the financial burden parents face entirely because they choose to exercise a constitutional
right.
148

149

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 657–58 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). Frankfurter likewise notes Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), in which the Court invalidated Hawaii’s deeply intrusive regulation of
private schools that taught in languages other than English. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 656–58 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Farrington stands for the right of parents to choose private schools that enjoy “reasonable
choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum and text-books.” Farrington, 273 U.S at 298.
150

151

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.

Cf. James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got There
First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1289 (2004) (arguing that “progressives” did support school choice at various
important historical junctures, but using the term in its contemporary political sense of “left-wing” rather
than to denote the capital-P “Progressives,” like Mann and Dewey, of the Progressive Era).
152

153 Although Mann and Dewey both opposed private schooling, neither supported its legal
prohibition. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1020–21 (1991). Dewey is on record having opposed the
Oregon statute struck down by Pierce. See id. at 1020 n.101. The constellations of ideological and political
opposition to the institution of private schooling during this period were complex, combining Progressive
common-school ideology, populist appeals to class conflict, and the imperturbable racism and antiCatholicism of the Ku Klux Klan and similar groups. See id. at 1017–19.
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the Court should avoid taking sides, elevating the ideological preference of
one camp to the level of constitutional principle.
Frankfurter’s argument had, and continues to have, particular force,
because it resonates with concerns about the unwarranted
constitutionalization of trendy social-scientific theories. Such concerns, of
course, are ones we associate with the jurisprudence of Barnette’s era.154
When Barnette elevates schooling in common and of learning by doing to the
level of constitutional principles—principles, moreover, purported to be
justified by a Constitution which itself nowhere mentions education or
articulates its purposes—it is hard not to hear echoes of Lochner v. New
York.155 Lochner stands for the dangers of a jurisprudence that adopts “a
moralized view of economic life.”156 It is hard to see how it is any less
dangerous for a jurisprudence to adopt a particular, “moralized view” of the
education of children. To indulge in the latter, no less than in the former,
improperly constitutionalizes a fashionable social-science theory that should
be understood to be contingent.
This concern is different from the worry that contemporary scholars
refer to as “First Amendment Lochnerism.”157 By this they mean efforts to
deploy the First Amendment in place of Spencerian laissez-faire capitalism
to justify the invalidation of economic regulation preferred by majorities.
Justice Jackson shared this fear, warning against First Amendment
“transcendentalism” in cases about Jehovah’s Witnesses contemporary to
Barnette.158 Jackson distinguished Barnette from these cases because
Barnette was about civil rather economic liberties, involving no balancing of
rights and therefore no improper elevation of the First Amendment.159 This
move tracks the modern lawyer’s instinct to assert that the right to contract is
distinct from, and more contingent than, expressive rights.160
But, as I have argued, compelled speech in school is not a
straightforward First Amendment violation whose analysis requires no
balancing. Freedom of expression in public school is not generally protected.
To resolve disputes about compelled expression in school requires a
pedagogical theory. And pedagogy in general, and citizenship education in
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See generally Kessler, supra note 115, at 1916.
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See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 197 (2014).
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See generally Kessler, supra note 115.
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Id. at 1970 (quoting and discussing Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 117 (1943)).
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See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943); Kessler, supra note 115,
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particular, are complex pieces of social engineering. Their “public
regulation” requires trade-offs and balancing at every turn.161
In rejecting Lochner, Justice Harlan wrote in dissent: “[l]et the State
alone in the management of its purely domestic affairs, so long as it does not
appear beyond all question that it has violated the Federal Constitution.” 162
Certainly with respect to a question among “the most debatable and difficult
questions of social science,” judges should disregard their own views of
which side “presents the sounder theory” and defer to the legislature.163
Education is a “debatable and difficult question of social science.” Schools
are the epitome of states’ “purely domestic affairs.” The Constitution may be
vague with respect to the freedom of contract,164 but it is entirely silent with
respect to schooling.
The core argument against Lochner thus tracks the argument of Gobitis
and of Justice Frankfurter’s Barnette dissent:165 When it comes to deciding
the proper manner of achieving a legitimate government goal, legislative
officials deserve substantial judicial deference.166 If “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,”167 how can
the First Amendment properly be read to enact Mr. John Dewey’s The School
and Society?
This question is particularly pointed because Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics itself enjoyed enormous influence in American educational circles.168
Spencer’s 1860 work, Education, Intellectual, Moral, and Physical, was even
more popular with the educated public, and was read ubiquitously among

161 Cf. id. at 1978 (“Making clear that Barnette had not signaled a departure from his more general
approach to the relationship between public regulation and civil liberty, Jackson reiterated the analysis of
the First Amendment he had first outlined in his Douglas v. City of Jeanette concurrence: ‘I think the
limits [on religious freedom] begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties
of others or of the public.’”) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)).
162 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 73 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
163

Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

164

W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).

Professor Bowie also notes the congruence of Lochner and Barnette. Both, he points out,
rejected compulsions imposed by the state upon private individuals. And both, he argues, were ultimately
“rein[ed] in” by the Court as incompatible with “workable government.” Bowie, supra note 9, at 19–25.
165

166 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); see also Kessler, supra note 115, at 1952–53.
167 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Holmes lists “school laws”
along with Sunday laws, usury laws, and lotteries as examples of widely accepted interference with the
liberty of contract as understood by the Lochner majority. Id.
168 See LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 1876–1957, at 91, 93 (1969); Brian Holmes, Herbert Spencer, 24 PROSPECTS
533, 535 (1994), https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02195287.
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professional educators.169 As Kieran Egan writes, “Spencer’s name is so
rarely mentioned in educational circles today that it is easy to forget how
avidly his book was read and reread by pretty well everyone involved in
making the new state schools. This was especially the case in the United
States.”170
The ideas expressed in these volumes, moreover, place Spencer squarely
among the earliest educational “Progressives.”171 In particular, Spencer not
only anticipates but directly influences many fundamental features of
Dewey’s thought.172 These include ideas ultimately reflected in the Deweyian
Progressivism of Barnette and Tinker: that education should be childcentered, that it should be founded in children’s process of discovery rather
than direct instruction by adults, and that active inquiry is vital to learning.173
In other ways, Spencer’s educational thinking diverged from the agenda
ultimately associated with educational Progressives, including Dewey:
Spencer endorsed white supremacy, favored private education, was
suspicious of public schooling, and thought that schools should focus upon
fields like languages, mathematics, and the sciences.174 Regardless whether
one focuses upon the points of agreement or disagreement between Dewey
and Spencer, if Spencer’s “moralized” economic theorizing ought not be
constitutionally enacted, it is hard to see why his proto-Progressive
educational thinking, or that of other Progressives in dialogue with it, merits
elevation to the level of constitutional principle.
It is also difficult not to hear in Barnette echoes of the problematic doll
studies cited in Brown v. Board of Education. Footnote 11 in Brown famously
supports its conclusion that segregated education teaches African American
children to understand themselves as inferior by citing “modern authority” in
the field of “psychological knowledge.”175 The footnote cites the work of
Mamie and Kenneth Clark, who had presented children with dolls of different
169 See CREMIN, supra note 168, at 91–92 (citing HERBERT SPENCER, EDUCATION:
INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL (1860)); Stephen Tomlinson, From Rousseau to Evolutionism:
Herbert Spencer on the Science of Education, 25 HIST. EDUC. 235, 236 (1996) (“Education soon became
Spencer’s best selling book, and may well have been the most popular text of its kind during the nineteenth
century.”).
170 See KIERAN EGAN, GETTING IT WRONG FROM THE BEGINNING: OUR PROGRESSIVIST
INHERITANCE FROM HERBERT SPENCER, JOHN DEWEY, AND JEAN PIAGET 12 (2002); see also id. at 3–4
(providing a publication history of Spencer’s educational writing).
171

See Holmes, supra note 168, at 535; Tomlinson, supra note 169, at 249.

See EGAN, supra note 170, at 4, 7; id. at 48 (finding in Dewey a “significant amount of echoing”
of Spencer); id. at 142 (noting “how strongly the fundamental principles of [Dewey’s] work repeat ideas
articulated by Spencer.”).
172

173

See id. at 15–19.

See CREMIN, supra note 168, at 92, 94; EGAN, supra note 170, at 23, 27–28 (noting various
departures from Spencer in Dewey’s thought).
174
175

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
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colors and recorded their responses.176 In the 1930s and 1940s as today, there
were many doubts about the scientific quality of empirical psychology in
general.177 Certainly since Brown many have pointed out the Clark studies’
particular methodological and interpretive lapses;178 and plenty of
psychological studies were available at the time of Brown which reached
conclusions different from the Clarks’.179 Research of this kind seems a slim
reed upon which to hang an important principle of constitutional law. The
Brown Court would have done better, many have argued, to justify its holding
on doctrinal and ideological grounds.180
Justice Jackson himself is reported to have been uncomfortable with the
decision to ground Brown in social science, worrying that it might be a
mistake to rely upon “elusive psychological and subjective factors” that “are
not determinable with satisfactory objectivity or measurable with reasonable
certainty.”181 How then must he have reacted when the Barnettes’ brief urged
upon him consideration of “the statements of authorities on educational
psychology which are noticed in the opinion of the United States Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Gobitis case”?182 Whatever concerns are
raised by the Clark studies are multiplied manyfold in the Circuit’s Gobitis
opinion, with its citation to a gallimaufry of “students of educational
psychology,” many of whose sole “psychological” qualifications appear to
be that they had opinions about how children learn that they were willing to
express in public.183 Although Jackson does not cite any of those experts, he
assentes to their assertions in his endorsement of learning by doing.184

176

Id. at 494 n.11.

Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. & Ellen M. Crouse, The American Psychological Association’s
Response to Brown v. Board of Education: The Case of Kenneth B. Clark, 57 AMER. PSYCHOL. 38, 40–
41 (2002).
177

178 See James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern
Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1661 (2003) (noting “the endless debate regarding the
significance of footnote eleven”); id. at 1660 n.3 (surveying the debate over the studies’ quality and
influence); Jack B. Weinstein, Brown v. Board of Education After Fifty Years, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 289,
291 n.8 (2004) (same).
179

Benjamin & Crouse, supra note 177, at 45.

180

See JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 51–52

(2001).
181 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 689 (1975).
182 Brief for Appellee at 49, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591),
1943 WL 71856, at *49 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683, 691 (3d Cir. 1939)).
183 Gobitis, 108 F.2d at 691 ; see sources cited supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. Holmes
argues that Herbert Spencer was similarly an educational “amateur.” Holmes, supra note 168, at 552.
184 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640–41. Cf. Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in
Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793,
814–15 (2002) (“The Court’s failure to cite empirical support for its findings of fact is particularly
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Barnette, in sum, may fairly be read to represent an educational Lochnerism
that ought to be repudiated—as applied to schoolchildren.
To reject the constitutionalization of Deweyian progressivism would
pose not the slightest challenge to the principle that “no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, religion, nationalism, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein”185—for ordinary citizens not in public school. Indeed, public school
students, when not present in school, are and would remain fully entitled to
this protection. Nor would it alter the conclusion that many varieties of
compelled religious expression are unconstitutional, within schools at least
as much as without.186
But, with respect to the regulation of secular student speech in public
school, it is hard to see, especially given today’s radically changing
technological circumstances and social beliefs, why Mann and Dewey (and
Spencer) should determine how much compelled expression can be
constitutionally tolerated. To be sure, no obvious substitute rule commends
itself. As noted in Part I, all pedagogy is ideological, undermining any hope
that the law could draw reasonable distinctions between fact and opinion, or
between instruction and indoctrination.187 The temptation to withdraw the
Constitution entirely from the field, though it offers intellectually
consistency, also seems false to the First Amendment and to the principle that
it must apply, somehow, within the schoolhouse gate.188
Perhaps what is necessary is a jurisprudential modesty that simply draws
the constitutional line at politically motivated restrictions of student
expression and compulsion of egregiously political or nakedly partisan
speech.189 Thus, students could not be forbidden to express any political view
in school settings where free conversation is otherwise allowed. Likewise,
schools would not be allowed to require pupils to recite, say, partisan
platforms as if they were catechisms, or to sing litanies in praise of the sitting
school board. It would also be consistent with a modest approach to student
expression to find within the First Amendment a rule that prohibits schools

conspicuous in early twentieth-century cases involving the states’ power to pass economic and social
welfare legislation.”).
185

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (forbidding religious establishment “whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (recognizing in the Free Exercise Clause “the right of every person
to freely choose his own course with reference [to religion], free of any compulsion from the state.”).
186

187

See supra Part I.A.

188

See Redish & Finnerty, supra note 19, at 95–96.

189

See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
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from requiring students to pledge allegiance to anything.190 That intuition—
that the fundamental wrongness of what was done to Marie and Gathie
Barnette was not to require them to speak, but to require them publicly to
confess their loyalty—is likely the reason that Barnette continues to
command allegiance among both lawyers and educators.191 At the same time,
with respect to schoolhouse restrictions and compulsions less egregious, less
naked, the time may have come to acknowledge that the First Amendment
has limited purchase.
Modesty does not mean turning our backs upon the practical wisdom
that Dewey articulated and Barnette and Tinker then codified. Educators
would be wise, as a matter of policy, to heed Dewey’s suggestion that
democratic education requires schools that are in some important measure
democratic, and to check whatever authoritarian impulses they might
harbor.192 Private schools as well as public schools would benefit from this
practice.
In addition, the constitutionalization of educational progressivism as
applied to student speech, however unwarranted with respect to the First
Amendment, might be justifiable under some state constitutions. Where the
federal constitution is silent with respect to education, every state extends to
students a right to receive a free, public education, and imposes a
constitutional duty upon itself to provide it.193 Many of the provisions that
impose this duty were drafted and ratified in explicitly Progressive contexts.
This is clear from their timing, their history, and sometimes their
vocabulary.194 I have written elsewhere to oppose reading state education
clauses as constitutionalizing Progressive education theory in its entirety.195
But in this instance, where state constitutional guarantees of free expression
intersect with state constitutional educational rights and duties, it can be
appropriate to understand states’ constitutional guarantees of expression in

190 Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)
(suggesting that requiring speakers to endorse “a Government-mandated pledge or motto” is a particularly
egregious violation of the First Amendment).
191 Professor Bowie reads Barnette to endorse a “misattribution” principle, which bars only
compulsions of expression that might “make others think that a person compelled to do something is doing
it voluntarily.” Bowie, supra note 9, at 9, 42. But see Abner Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 833, 840 (2010) (“Barnette did not discuss misattribution.”). A misattribution approach would likely
still render public schools “unworkable,” because schoolhouse pedagogy consistently intermingles
compulsion and voluntarism. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
192

See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); Scott R. Bauries, The
Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 719–25 (2012).
193

194 See Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 B.C.
L. REV. 909, 932–33 (2007) (reviewing case law and related secondary literature).
195

See id.
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school in terms of Progressive pedagogical theory.196 Under many states’
constitutional law, therefore, the approach of Barnette and Tinker might find
solid ground.197
But today, with Barnette seventy-five years old, with Dewey even
further in the past, with public schools in privileged communities walled off
literally as well as figuratively from those of the poor, with charter schools
proliferating, and with an explosion of personalized and differentiated online
educational options visible on the horizon, Frankfurter’s argument in favor
of judicial deference to state schools resounds with new force. Civic learning
by doing likely remains, today at least as much as seventy-five years ago, a
fine idea. But the First Amendment does not guarantee it.

196 Cf. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (arguing that cases that present “hybrid”
intersections of constitutional rights justify departures from otherwise appropriate First Amendment
analysis). Student expression cases are quintessential examples of such an intersection at the state level.
197 Indeed, a more modest federal jurisprudence would facilitate the analysis of state constitutional
law along the lines suggested here.

